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1990'larla birlikte İnşacılık Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında ana teorilerden biri haline geldi ve bu alana önemli katkılarda bulundu. İnşacı teorisyenler arasında Alexander Wendt inşacılık ve realizm arasında ortak bir zemin bulma çabasıyla en çok dikkat çeken teorisyen oldu. Bu birbirinden farklı iki teorik bakış açısının uyuşması mümkün müdür? Bu çalışma
 Wendt' 
Introduction
Since the Cold War period, the U.S. has had a strong hand in the articulation of international security as well as in the construction of humanitarian intervention and the promotion of democracy norms.1 Especially after the 9/11 events the Bush administration declared war against international terror and initiated a policy of democracy promotion mainly through hard power. Drastic measures taken by the Bush administration opened the international arena for the debate over boundaries of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion especially through military intervention, which would also prevent international terror. Since then, these two norms, or called as institutions, have occupied the agenda of international society. Concomitantly, thanks to the hegemonic power, the U.S. effect on the constitution of these two norms reached its zenith. While the U.S. 's effect on construction of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion has been more powerful, Turkey's contribution has been restricted due to limited material capabilities. Therefore, Turkey's identity and interests have been constrained and shaped by these institutions comparative to the U.S..
During the Justice and Development Party ( JDP) government, Turkey initiated a new Turkish foreign policy called "zero problems with neighbors". This new initiative has targeted the creation of a new peace-prone identity, realized through establishing better relations with neighbors especially in the Middle East. Besides providing economic gains, better relations would lead to the democratization of the region, which would contribute to both regional and international security. Within the framework of this "zero problems with neighbors" policy, good neighborly relations were established with Libya and Syria; and Turkey attempted to perpetuate 
Constructivism and Wendt
1990s witnessed so-called constructivist turn in International Relations partly because mainstream IR theories failed to predict and explain the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War and their analytical tools were incapable of explaining post-Cold War social developments.2 A growing number of scholars started studying IR phenomena within the constructivist framework, which embedded in the critical theory. These scholars include Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, Martha Finnemore, Jutta Weldes and Raymond Duvall and many more.3 Among constructivists, Alexander Wendt has a special place as he has been appreciated for his sophisticated constructivist challenge posited towards rational choice theories, mostly structural realism known also as neorealism. Although Nicholas Onuf (1989) has been accepted as the "father" of social constructivist research area in IR domain, Alexander Wendt has been one of the most preeminent scholars of contemporary IR constructivist scholarship thanks to his attempt to bring social constructivism to IR domain in order to find a middle ground between rationalism or positivism, and reflectivism or relativism.4
Constructivists have underlined the importance of ideational structures besides material ones unlike neorealist assumption, which neglects ideational structures. Emphasizing ideas constitute the basis of interests; constructivists reveal the construction process of ideas and Waltz (1979) with his book "Theory of International Politics"; neorealism could not anticipate the structural change, the end of Cold War by the collapse of the USSR. The source of this failure was apathetic understanding of international structure and states. In order to analyze IR matters, neorealism (and its cohort neoliberalism to some extent) combines an individualist micro-economic approach to the international system with the classical realist emphasis on power and interest based on materialism.6 Wendt charges this individualism, materialism, and neglect of interaction form the core of neorealist structuralism when clarifying the causes of its failure to predict the structural change.7 By opposing individualism, Wendt sides with holism and confirms that there is an international structure as neorealism assumes but what diverges the path with neorealist approach is their different stances concerning how much ideas matter along with material forces in this structure. Wendt does not 5 Martha Finnemore (1996) reject individualism utterly because an analysis of states can be conducted on the individual level due to the assumption that "states are people too" since they are purposive actors with a sense of self.8 One of the main puzzles in IR is agent-structure problem. Scholars debate about the ontological priority of agency and structure. While neorealism attempts to solve agent-structure problem by making states agents given (through billiard ball analogy), world systems analysis proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) makes system structures primitive units; yet, these attitudes result in an inability to explain the properties and causal powers of their primary units of analysis, a weakness which seriously cripples their potential explanations of state action.9 Structuration theory, borrowed from Anthony Giddens (1984) , helps escaping the agent-structure problem because by conceptualizing agents and structures as mutually constituted or co-determined entities, it enables development of both systemic and statist theoretical accounts without engaging in either ontological reductionism or reification.10 The philosophical foundation of structuration theory is scientific realism, which defines agents and structures as distinct and observable entities; hence, Wendt declares himself as realist.11 The significance of scientific realism is that it helps building a via media between positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology by acknowledging social kinds are materially grounded meanwhile social kinds give meaning to materials so that the relationship between social and material kinds 8 Ibid., 9 Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization, 1987, Vol. 41, No. 3, p.337. 10 Ibid., pp. 349-350. 11 Ibid., pp. 350,360; Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith et. al., (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996) showing how arbitrary, particular and historically generated are the logocentric structures, which mark language and thought so to say, knowledge.13 By highlighting the role of ideas, Wendt establishes a balance between material and social forces. Therefore, a successful analysis of international relations should consider discursive capabilities besides material resources because ideas give meaning to material forces concurrently constituting social structures.14 Ideas construct social structure, which constitute actors with certain identities and interest whereas interest-constituting ideas are in turn constituted by the shared ideas or culture of the international system; hence, there is mutual constitution of ideas and social structure.15 Consequently, Wendt identifies the structure of social system, which contains three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas, thus, he accepts that there are material elements in the social structure as realists claim, yet they explain little themselves.16 While material conditions are the basis of interests and ideas, ideas and interests shape them.17 For instance, although the United Kingdom is a powerful country along with nuclear powers, the United States perceives North Korea, with much less power 12 Alexander Wendt, 1999, Ibid., pp.76-77,91. 13 Steve Smith, Ibid., pp.29-31. 14 Regarding the relationship between material and ideational factors, Wendt argues, "Material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings, and social meanings are not immune to material effects". See Alexander Wendt 1999 , Ibid., pp.111-112. 15 Alexander Wendt, 1999 and limited nuclear capacity, as a threat. Therefore, ideas and interests affect the perception of material conditions. By stating "There are no structures without agents, and no agents (except in a biological sense) without structures. Social processes are always structured, and social structures are always in process." Wendt confronts Kenneth Waltz's more deterministic understanding of international structure because Wendt suggests simultaneous construction of agents and structure in continuous process.18 Overall, Wendt contends that identities and interests of agents and international structure are in an interaction. He defines identities as subjective self-understandings. Identities cannot exist apart from interests because identities are the basis of interests.19 Therefore, when an agency enters into interaction with international structure or another agency, its identities and interest are affected. In sum, Wendt proclaims the basic idea that identities and their corresponding interests are produced when an agency interacts with international structure and significant others. In this identity-interest formation process how actors are treated by significant others plays an important role because others' behavior affects self-understanding and then reinforces identity.20 This identity formation process known as the principle of "reflected appraisals" or mirroring because actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how other appraise and treat them and they evaluate themselves in the "mirror" of Others' representations of the Self. Within the framework of Weldes (1996 Weldes ( , 1999 analyzes. Similarly, Wendt deconstructs national interests by challenging neorealist claim that states seek power because they feel insecure in international arena due to anarchy. Wendt argues that there is no such thing as "logic of anarchy" per se but there are three kinds of cultures or international systems under which states operate.23 Wendt opposes systemic theories like neorealism and world systems theory take states given because of self-help system generated by anarchy which homogenize states by motivating them for survival and lust for power. By confronting systemic theories, Wendt asserts that there is no single logic Although anarchy constrains states, intersubjective meanings attained to it determine the scope of relations among states. Thus, besides being affected by each other, states also are affected by intersubjective meanings, which are also constructed by states. As a result, state actors and systemic structures are mutually constitutive. In this mutual construction process, states, as intentional corporate bodies, are responsible for both their own identities and interests and also intersubjective meanings when they enter into interaction with others. Through analysis of this construction process, Wendt challenges rationalist theories which reduces states to effects of international structure and neglects the formation of identities and interests within the state, not just behavior of state.25 Nevertheless, this critique of rationalist theories does not rule out rationalist accounts altogether because Wendt's constructivism drawn from structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology attempts to build bridge between reflectivist and rationalist traditions.26 Wendt admits the distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but he conditions the distribution of power by the distribution of knowledge, in other words the intersubjective understandings and expectations, because they constitute states' conceptions of self and the other. Consequently, Wendt assumes that all states regardless of their power are influenced by intersubjective understandings, which give meaning to power. In this formulation, Wendt assumes states as equals; yet states differ 24 Alexander Wendt argues that among these types of anarchies, Hobbesian system is not inevitable, self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy as rationalists claim; rather they are institutions of anarchy, not essential features of it, hence anarchy is what states make of it. See Alexander Wendt, 1992, Ibid., pp.394-395, 399 . Also see Dale Copeland, Ibid., p.6 
Wendt Revised: A New Model
In "Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics" edited by Stefano Guzzini Anna Leander (2006) , various scholars criticize Wendt on various issues such as identity, scientific realism Selin KARANA ŞENOL affecting and being influenced by intersubjective meanings and expectations. In this formulation, State A and State B are assumed as equal powers both constructing intersubjective understandings and expectations equally and being equally affected as well. However, states differ along with their capabilities and material powers as well as soft powers.28 Therefore, my revised model depicted in Figure 2 , incorporates power component, which plays an important role in international politics. Relative influence on intersubjective meanings and expectations are symbolized as thicker arrows while thinner arrows signified less influence. Since states are not equal in terms of their capabilities and soft powers, their positions should be differentiated. As their powers differ, their influence on the creation of intersubjective meanings and expectations is different, as well. As a result, while State A affects intersubjective understandings and expectations more, State B's effect is lesser. Moreover, since State A has more soft and hard power imbedded in material capabilities, it is less influenced by intersubjective meanings. In this framework, State A's action is more influential than State B's since State A has more say in international arena than State B. As a result, State B has to comply with international rules and norms more than State A and can contribute the creation of intersubjective meanings less than State A. In addition, I believe that apart from states' actions, their position or existence in the international system affects intersubjective understandings and expectations. For instance, although the U.S. does not intervene directly into a weak state's identity and interests or shape it totally, its existence or position in the international system through soft power can influence other states' identities and interests. Therefore, power matters in international politics.
There are many examples of how the U.S as the super power has affected intersubjective meanings as well as institutions. For example, Besides the self-defense norm, humanitarian intervention was also articulated with the promotion of democracy along with protecting people under repressive authoritarian regimes and countering international terrorism. The U.S. tried to justify its intervention in Panama in December 1989 as a restoration of democracy but it was not acceptable in international law in the structure of the UN Charter.33 The Kosovo crisis of 1999 became a corner stone because the NATO bombing, out of UN control area to support repressed ethnic Albanian population within Kosovo, was justified without the UN authorization.34 Despite the lack of UN authorization, it was consistent with the international humanitarian law since the act was not condemned by the UN and attained international support.35 Similar to Panama case, the U.S. used the humanitarian intervention discourse before intervening into Iraq in 2003. In recent years, Syria has occupied the international agenda in terms of humanitarian intervention; yet due to Russian and Chinese veto, no measures could be taken.
To elaborate my arguments, in the next section, I will first discuss the emergence of Turkey's new identity and in conjunction, I will apply my model to the case study of Turkish foreign policy towards Libya and Syria following the start of rebellions in 2011. During the JDP government, especially after 2009 when Ahmet Davutoğlu took the foreign minister position, Turkey initiated a new foreign policy with dynamic and multi-dimensional approach replacing old foreign policy understanding, which considered Turkey as a frontier country during the Cold War and a bridge country after the end of it.36 In the old foreign policy understanding, the realist approach in foreign policy was dominant and defensive non-involvement realpolitik was the main principle shaping the diplomatic practices.37 Based on Davutoğlu's world vision, new foreign policy rejected both of these positions because postCold War period required new vision and strategy to cope with changing dynamics of international relations.38 Davutoğlu asserted that Turkey has central country status thanks to its geographical location, which provides 
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Turkey the "Strategic Depth" along with "historical depth".39 This new identity of "central country" or "regional and future global power" required change in foreign policy practices as they mirror the national identity.40 In order to fulfill the requirements of this central country position and being a center of attraction in the region, Turkey would follow five principles of this new foreign policy approach. These five principles are "balance between security and democracy in a country", "zero problem policy toward Turkey's neighbors", "developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond", "adherence to a multidimensional foreign policy", and "rhythmic diplomacy".41 Along with these principles, Turkish foreign policy changed from passive to active in international affairs. For instance, Before Davutoğlu period, Turkey had prioritized its relationship with the West and had cut its ties with the Middle East because of Westernization efforts and escape from the Ottoman history.43 However, "Strategic Depth" doctrine with active foreign policy understanding contributed to recovery of relations with neighbors in the Middle East44 Davutoğlu adds five general principles of Turkish foreign policy further principles related to the relations with Middle Eastern countries. These principles consist of "security for everyone", "priority must be given to dialogue as a means of solving crises", "economic interdependence", and "cultural coexistence and plurality".45 These principles anticipated desecuritization of relations with the neighbors in the Middle East. Desecuritization in Turkish foreign policy has many causes like the decline in military control over the foreign policy, the impact of the EU conditionality and change in foreign policy making elite.46 Whatever the source of desecuritization is, it does not change the fact that desecuritization is part of identity change; hence it should be considered within the framework of new identity, which does not contain only desecuritization but more. Through desecuritization, instead of hard Selin KARANA ŞENOL power, Turkey's new identity emphasized the use of soft power, which targets becoming a center of attraction and inspiring other countries to democratize especially in the Middle East.47 As the soft power should be supported by economic power, Turkey turned into a "trading state" through zero problems with neighbors.48 In economic terms, Turkey's relations with neighbors grew out of three channels which are increasing economic and trade relations with developing trade volume, broader movement of people and lastly, civil society contacts reinforcing the integration process by assisting the diffusion of values of democracy, conflict resolution and cooperation in addition to liberal market economics.49 A significant part of this new approach towards the Middle East has been depicting Turkey as "regional security provider" and "regional arbiter".50 Along with the "zero problems with neighbor" policy, this principle in Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East has foreseen cooperation and dialogue with neighbors in order to overcome security problems and foster economic development and prosperity. Moreover, Turkey would 47 Siret Hursoy, Ibid., pp.141-142; Aylin Güney and Nazif Mandacı, Ibid., pp.437,442; Özlem Tür and Ahmet K. Han, Ibid., p.25; Daphne McCurdy, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: When Opposites Attract", Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2008, Vol. 7, No. 2, p.88 become a role model for the region, as supported also by the U.S., with reconciling moderate Islam and democracy, and successful economic development.51 Therefore, Davutoğlu projected becoming a regional power, which would be the first stage of becoming world power.52 However, with the outbreak of protests in the Middle East against repressive regimes in 2010 starting with Tunisia, Turkey dragged into a dilemma because helping protest movements would conflict with "zero problems with neighbors" policy; yet siding with repressive governments crushing their own people would violate the principle of security provider and democracy promoter through soft power.53 Under these conditions, the best option compatible with Turkey's new identity would be playing the regional arbiter role, which would balance two principles of "zero problems" and "security provider". However, being deficient in material capabilities, Turkey could not hold on to its new identity and had to compromise. In addition, the interactions between Turkey and the U.S. contributed making concessions, which started with the humanitarian intervention into Libya.54 Moreover, the spread of protest movements to Syria further challenged Turkey's new identity and 51 Aylin Güney and Nazif Mandacı, Ibid., pp.440; Özlem Tür and Ahmet K. Han, Ibid., p.18; Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, Ibid., p.140; Jülide Karakoç, Ibid., pp.223, 225, 235, 238; Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria", The Washington Quarterly, 2012, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 131. 52 Ahmet Davutoğlu, 2008, Ibid., p.96. 53 Birgül Demirtaş, Ibid., p.116. 54 Walker, (ibid., p.46) argues that Turkey cannot simply pursue its regional policies independent of Washington due to the preponderance of U.S. power at both a global and a regional level. Although mainstream constructivist approach rejects these power structures in explanation of state behavior, my model does not deny the impact of power in states' interaction. Due to asymmetric influence of a super power and middle power in both intersubjective meanings and their mutual identities, it is hard for Turkey to pursue policies without entering interaction with the U.S. However, this does not necessarily mean total domination or bandwagoning of Turkey is compulsory act as realists claim.
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Turkey had to abandon the assertive role that it aspired to play in the preArab Spring period and "zero problems with neighbors" policy gradually.55 Therefore, the next section will analyze the concessions in Turkey's identity and change in Turkish foreign policy towards Libya and Syria.
The Case Study of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Libya: To Intervene or Not to İntervene?
The Middle East and North Africa have been dragged into turmoil starting with protests against authoritarian government in Tunisia in 17 December 2011.56 The riots in Tunisia were followed by outbreak of protests in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and lastly Syria. Up to now Tunisia's President Ben Ali, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan President Moammar Gaddafi have been overthrown from power and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh preceded by his deputy in 2012; only Syrian President Bashar Assad is still struggling to stop insurgents.57 NATO organized a humanitarian intervention, starting with 31 March 2011 only to Libya among these states.
Before NATO's intervention, when debates on a possible intervention were continuing, Turkey opposed to NATO's intervention into Libya. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said "Military intervention by NATO in Libya or any other country would be totally counter-productive. In addition to being counter-productive, such an operation could have dangerous 
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Thus, realist accounts can explain Turkey's negative attitude because NATO's intervention would damage economic interests and activities especially construction investments.63 Moreover, Turkey refrained from taking part in any unilateral NATO intervention because the U.S. and NATO's involvement might have led to an Iraq-like invasion.64 However, on the contrary to realist expectations, eventually Turkey agreed to take part in NATO's humanitarian intervention by sending five Turkish warships and one submarine in order to monitor the UN embargo.65 While initially, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared the NATO operation as unnecessary and nonsense by harshly criticizing the states supporting any intervention into Libya, just in a month's time he changed his mind and discourse. What was the main drive behind this change in Turkish foreign policy? How can this foreign policy change be explained? Realist and neorealist explanations cannot solve this puzzle because material capabilities of all parties stayed same during two months and Turkey took the initiative despite economic damage. Moreover, one can be suspicious of Turkey's responsibilities towards NATO, which might play role in the change of policy preference through path dependency. However, historical institutionalism borrows analytical tools from constructivism because it uses the internationalization of norms along with path dependency in order to explain foreign policy decisions. Moreover, Turkey did not have to actively contribute to NATO and it could settle with neutrality rather than supporting the operation because NATO membership requires the support of member states only when a member state is attacked by another state but Libya is not a NATO member; hence, there is no obligation of supporting NATO for 63 Henri J. Barkey, "Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 2012, Vol. 54, No. 6, p.150. 64 Ömer Taşpınar, Ibid., p.135. 65 Birgül Demirtaş, Ibid., p.116 .
the operation in Libya. Therefore, all of these approaches fail to explain this foreign policy change while constructivist approach offers the best explanation for this puzzle because the main factor behind this was Turkey's new identity, which supported peace and democracy in the Middle East region. Although this operation would both result in damage in economic interests and concession in "zero problems with neighbors" policy, promoting democracy and providing security in the region surpass these concessions. Nevertheless, the preponderance of promotion of democracy and security in the region is a product of Turkey's interaction with the U.S. especially through phone call between the President Barrack Obama and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.66 Through this interaction, the U.S. affected the identity of Turkey by adjusting and harmonizing their attitude towards humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. Moreover, in the past 20 years the U.S. played an important role in setting the boundaries of humanitarian intervention as well as democracy promotion as the Kosovo and Iraq interventions demonstrated. Consequently, the U.S. affected the construction of intersubjective knowledge or institutions, in this case humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion, more than Turkey and Turkey had to comply with these norms because its material capabilities and power fell short to affect and redefine these norms as the U.S. did. Turkey's inability to foster a collaborative humanitarian intervention into Syria clarifies further the asymmetric influence of Turkey and the U.S. on these norms; hence, the next section focuses on Turkey's foreign policy change towards Syria. Nationalism and Ethnicity, 2012, Vol. 40, No. 5, p.739. 68 Ömer Taşpınar, Ibid., pp.135; Joshua W. Walker, Ibid., pp.39-40; Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, Ibid., pp.510-511; Stephen F. Larrabee, Ibid., p.166; Shaista Shaheen Zafar, Ibid., pp.154-155; Birgül Demirtaş, Ibid., p.111 Meanwhile, Turkey both has suffered the increasing costs of Syrian refugees and persisted in calling for humanitarian intervention. Like Libya case, Turkey's approach to the Syrian issue not just contradicted with "zero problems with neighbors" policy but also almost abandonment of it as it called for military intervention.88 Although Turkey was willing to do whatever necessary to remove Assad by calling for humanitarian intervention, due to its limited capacity and power to change intersubjective knowledge or institution -in this case humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion-Turkey has had to live with the fact that there will not be a humanitarian intervention soon.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I attempted to present Alexander Wendt's constructivist arguments, which I believe shed light to identity and interest construction process of states and intersubjective institutions and norms. However, since Wendt assumes states as equivalent in this construction process, I posited my model by building on Wendt's ideas and adding power component, which is imbedded in material capabilities, to it. I argued that on the international arena, states have different material and ideational capabilities; hence, great powers have more influence on the creation of intersubjective meanings and expectations. Moreover, weak states have to comply with the international rules and norms to which they contribute less whereas great powers are not constrained by international social structure as much as weak states. Furthermore, weak states' identities and 87 Steven Heydemann, Ibid., p.70; Seth G. Jones, Ibid., p.53; Eyal Zisser, Ibid., p.108. 88 Birgül Demirtaş, Ibid., Libya and Syria and argued that Turkey's identity has been affected by humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion norms, which are intensively affected by the U.S thanks to being super power. In Turkey's foreign policy approaches towards these two states, whenever there is a dilemma of choosing between security and promotion of democracy, which are the main principles of Turkey's new identity, Turkey has chosen the former. Turkey's decision to make concession of its new identity has been a product of the interaction process between the U.S and Turkey as the cases of Libya and Syria have demonstrated. Turkey has affected the intersubjective knowledge and institutions -humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion as well as threat perception of international organizations-less than the U.S.; hence, it has followed the international norms mainly articulated by the U.S.
